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Abstract—Radio frequency identification (RFID) has been con-
sidered as one of the imperative requirements for implementation
of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications. It helps to solve the
identification issues of the things in a cost-effective manner, but
RFID systems often suffer from various security and privacy
issues. To solve those issues for RFID systems, many schemes
has been recently proposed by using the cryptographic primitive,
called physically uncloneable functions (PUFs), which can ensure
tamper-evident feature. However, to the best of our knowledge,
none of them has succeeded to address the problem of privacy
preservation with the resistance of DoS attacks in a practical way.
For instance, existing schemes need to rely on exhaustive search
operations to identify a tag, and also suffer from several security
and privacy related issues. Furthermore, a tag needs to store some
security credentials (e.g., secret shared keys), which may cause
several issues such as loss of forward and backward secrecy and
large storage costs. Therefore, in this paper, we first propose a
lightweight privacy-preserving authentication protocol for RFID
system by considering ideal PUF environment. Subsequently, we
introduce an enhanced protocol which can support the noisy
PUF environment. It is argued that both of our protocols can
overcome the limitations of existing schemes, and further ensure
more security properties. By analyzing the performance, we have
shown that the propose solutions are secure, efficient, practical,
and effective for the resource-constraint RFID tag.
Index Terms—Anonymity, Lightweight, Authentication, Radio
frequency identification (RFID), Physically uncloneable functions
(PUFs).
I. INTRODUCTION
RADIO frequency identification (RFID) technology is get-ting more involved in several IoT applications ranging
from health-care to anti-counterfeiting protection. A typical
RFID system consists of three components: RFID tag, reader,
and a backend server. One of the key features of the RFID
system is that a tag can be interrogated by a reader without
line-of-sight contact. Therefore, RFID technology poses a
great deal of security threats related to tag user’s privacy,
including the revelation of sensitive information and user
location tracking [1]. In some cases, if a reader can be
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malicious then it can reveal the current location of the tag user
to an adversary. Therefore, it is important that the interrogating
process in the RFID system must be anonymous, where no one
except the backend server should be able to know the exact
identity of the tag.
In general, RFID tags are considered as the resource
constrained devices, accordingly it is always feasible to use
lightweight cryptographic primitives in designing anonymous
authentication protocol for RFID system. Therefore, most of
the RFID authentication protocols use symmetric-key system
such as hash function. On the other hand, physically un-
cloneable functions (PUFs) [2] have gained popularity as an
alternative primitive for providing security in RFID system.
PUFs are the result of the manufacturing process of integrated
circuits (ICs), which introduce random physical verifications
into the micro structure of IC, to make it unique. PUFs are
basically ICs which use their internal structures to provide one-
way function that cannot be duplicated. The PUFs are easy to
be constructed with a few number of gates [3] and their outputs
are difficult to predict but easy to evaluate. This makes them
to be a good choice for use as a security primitives for RFID
system.
A. Possible Security Threats and Attacks in the RFID System
Since the communication channel between the tag and
reader is insecure that makes the RFID system vulnerable to
the flowing security threats and attacks.
Privacy against eavesdropper (PAE): Due to the insecure
radio frequency channel, the communication between tag and
reader can be easily eavesdropped. After eavesdropping, an
attacker can monitor the tag to know user’s location and
movement, when the tag identifier is fixed, the user identity
can be linked to the tag. . To ensure security against PAE, it
is important that the entire tag interrogating process must be
anonymous.
Attack against forward secrecy: If an attacker somehow
can manage the secrets of tags, then he/she will be able to
trace all the previous communications of the tag. Therefore, a
protocol which cannot handle this issue will be vulnerable to
backward untraceability problem [4].
Desynchronization or DoS attacks: An attacker can cause
de-synchronization problem by blocking a message between
tag and reader. Precisely, in many RFID-based authentication
protocols, both the back end server and tag needs to update
their secret security credentials to ensure forward secrecy.
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Table I
SYMBOLS AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTION
Symbol Definition
TID iT Temporary identity of the tag T for i-th round
CRP(Ci , Ri ) Challenge-Response pair for the i-th round
Ki Session key for the i-th round
PUFT Secure physically uncloneable functions for tag T
h(.) One-way hash function
⊕ Exclusive-OR operation
|| Concatenation operation
Hence, when the response message from the backend server
is blocked then the tag cannot comprehend that whether the
interrogation was successful or not. In this case, it is possible
that the server updates its database, but tag does not. This will
cause DoS attacks [5].
Impersonation attacks: An attacker may try to impersonate
as a legitimate tag user and send query to a reader and bypass
the interrogation process. Similarly, the attacker can also try
to impersonate as a legitimate reader. In this regard, one of the
naive approach could be the attacker intercept the messages
between tag and reader and reuses the message to impersonate
as a legitimate tag or a legitimate reader.
Physical attacks: The attacker compromises a tag and
accesses the tag’s memory to obtain secure information such
as secret key through cold boot attacks [24]. This is a kind of
side channel attack in which an attacker with physical access
to tag is able to retrieve some useful informations stored in
the tag. Then the attacker may try to trace all the previous
communications of the tag user’s. Most of the existing RFID
authentication protocols are vulnerable to this attack.
Cloning attack: Since most of the tags are not tamper-proof
, an attacker can build a cloned tag which will be interpreted
by the reader as a legitimate tag.
B. Related Work and Motivation
Over the past years, some interesting privacy preserving
anonymous authentication schemes for RFID have been pro-
posed, which can be divided into three categories: 1) public
key crypto system (PKC), 2) error correction (EC), and 3)
symmetric key or non-public key crypto system (NPKC) based
schemes. Among PKC based schemes [6-11], most of them
are designed on elliptic curve cryto systems, which is quite
infeasible due to the expensive hardware cost. EC based
schemes [12-16] can ensure security only when the error rate
is less than a certain threshold value. Besides, these schemes
are not scalable, since they can only support a limited number
tags. The NPKC schemes can be divided into two categories
i.e., hash based schemes [17-20] and PUF based schemes [21-
26]. Hash based schemes can not guarantee security against
any physical and cloning attacks. Because of that, PUF based
schemes have gained more popularity in recent years. There
are several works in the literature that utilized PUFs to ensure
authentication for the RFID system. In 2008, Bringer et al.
proposed a tree-based authentication scheme using PUFs in
[21]. However, the protocol cannot ensure security against
DoS and impersonation attacks [22] . Hereafter, Sadeghi et
al. proposed a new PUF-based scheme for RFID in [22],
but Kardas et al. revealed that the scheme proposed in [22]
is vulnerable to the cold boot attack [24]. An attacker after
tampering a tag can easily impersonate it and even can trace
its previous and future communications. Hereafter Akgun et
al. proposed a tree based authentication protocol for RFID
using PUFs [23]. However, their protocol is also proven to
be vulnerable cold boot attack presented in [24] and hence
they cannot ensure the desired security properties. In 2012,
Kardas et al. proposed an RFID authentication protocol [25]
using PUFs, but the scheme cannot ensure forward secrecy
and resilience of DoS attacks. Jung et al. proposed a HMAC-
based RFID authentication scheme using PUF however, their
scheme is also vulnerable to DoS attacks.
Recently, Akgun et al. proposed another PUF-based au-
thentication scheme for RFID system [26]. However, after
thoroughly investigate we found that the scheme cannot ensure
forward secrecy support, which is an imperative security
requirement in RFID system. We also found that all the
existing PUF-based RFID schemes can be impractical, where a
reader needs to perform exhaustive search operation in order
to identify a tag, which may impair the performance of the
system. For instance, in [26], the proposed scheme encodes
the identity of the tag Ti using a hash function. In that case,
to identify the tag the backend server needs to try all possible
combinations of the secrets ai and bi . The similar scenario
can also be seen in other PUF-based authentication schemes.
Furthermore, all the existing RFID schemes require to store
secret keys on the tag memory. In that case, apart from the
storage cost, once the tag is compromised, the attacker can
obtain those secrets from the tag memory and perform several
attacks.
All the aforesaid schemes [21-26] are designed based on
the assumption of the noise-resilient or ideal PUFs [31-32].
Recently, a few interesting PUF-based authentication protocols
[33-35] and [38] have been proposed for RFID systems,
where noise has been taken into account. However, there
are some shortcomings in theses schemes. For example, in
[33], during authentication, the tag discloses its identity for
assisting the verifier to find a previous PUF output z, so this
scheme cannot ensure the privacy of the tag. To address this
issue, two other PUF-based authentication schemes [34-35]
have been proposed, however, in these schemes, the server
needs to launch an exhaustive search to identify the device.
Hence, these schemes are not scalable especially for the
applications with a large scale of database. Moreover, after
carefully investigate we found that the scheme presented in
[35] cannot ensure the untraceability property. In this regard,
when a communication failure/error occurs, the device will
generate and interact using the same authentication field value
c as used in the previous communication, and this could be
used to identify the tag. Furthermore, Huth et al. [38] revealed
that in the scheme of [35], an attacker can obtain the helper
data for each round since the symmetric key sk stored in non-
volatile memory, could be exposed, and addressed this issue by
proposing an improved protocol. However, the proposed pro-
tocol in [38] requires to perform an additional channel-based
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Figure 1. Setup Phase of the Proposed Authentication Protocol for Ideal PUFs
key agreement (CBKA) phase. Generally, the performance
of CBKA is greatly depending on the environment, so they
cannot work well, i.e., provide low key rate, especially when
the channel fading is not dynamic such as indoor. Besides,
similar to [34-35], the protocol presented in [38] needs to
launch an exhaustive search operation in order to verify the
prover.
This paper seeks to address all these issues including the
accomplishing of untracebility property in a realistic way. For
that, we first propose a novel privacy preserving authentication
protocol for RFID systems in ideal PUF environments, which
can deal with several security issues including the physical
attacks. Then, we present our enhanced protocol which can
be used in the noisy PUF environments. Subsequently, we
evaluate the security of the proposed schemes through the
formal analysis. Finally, we demonstrate the performance
of our proposed protocols by comparing to that of other
existing PUF-based authentication protocols for RFID. The
key contributions of this article can be summarized as follows:
• The proposed authentication protocols can ensure several
key security properties including anonymity, availability,
resilience of DoS attacks, and forward secrecy, which
are all desirable in several critical IoT applications and
services.
• The proposed protocols can also guarantee higher degree
of practicality and efficiency. Specifically, in our proposed
scheme, the backend server need not to perform any
exhaustive search operation to identify the tag. Moreover,
it does not require any secret key to be stored on the tag
device.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section
II, we first present our novel lightweight privacy preserving
authentication protocol for ideal PUFs. Then we introduce our
enhanced protocol for noisy PUF environment. Security of
the proposed protocols are analyzed in Section III. A relevant
discussion based on the performance of the proposed protocol
is presented in Section IV. The symbols and cryptographic
functions used in this article are defined in Table I.
II. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we describe our proposed privacy-preserving
anonymous authentication protocols for RFID system. Before
describing our protocols, we give brief overview of the adver-
sary model and some underlying assumptions for the proposed
scheme.
A. Adversary Model
We consider two categories of adversaries: Type 1 and Type
2. Type 1 adversary denotes the typical Dolev-Yao intruder
[27], who can eavesdrop on the radio link between a tag and
a reader. This type of adversary can alter messages and also
be able to block some messages from a tag reader, or vice
verse. Type 2 adversary is stronger than the Type 1, who has
all the capabilities of Type 1 and additionally can perform any
physical or cloning attacks. Besides, we assume that there are
several readers in the system, and the adversary has the control
over a subset of them (i.e., rouge readers).
B. Assumptions
We make the following assumptions regarding our proposed
protocol for RFID system.
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Figure 2. The Proposed Lightweight and Practical Anonymous Authentication Protocol for Ideal PUF-based RFID System
1) An RFID tag consists of a micro controller attached to
a PUF, where the PUF output depends on its unique
physical characteristics. Any attempt to tamper with
the PUF changes the behavior of the tag and that will
eventually renders the tag useless. Considering PUF as
a challenge-response pair (CRP), where the response of
R of a challenge C in PUFT can be represented as
R = PUFT (C ).
2) We assume that there is a secure connection between the
reader and the backend server, so the adversary cannot
access that link.
3) RFID tags have limited resources while backend servers
are considered as legitimate and have no such limitation.
C. Proposed Anonymous Authentication Protocol for Ideal
PUFs
Setup Phase of the Proposed Protocol for Ideal PUFs:
Every tags need to be registered into the backend server. For
that, first the server needs to randomly generate a challenge Ci
and a set of emergency challenges Cem = {c1,c2 ,...,cn}, and
then sends {Ci , Cem} to the tag T . Hereafter, the tag produces
the responses {Ri , Rem} by using its unique embedded
function PUFT , and subsequently sends {Ri , Rem} to the
server. After that, the server generates a unique temporary
identity TID iT for the i -th round, and a set of unique un-
linkable pseudo identities PID = {pid1, pid2 , ...,pidn},
and sends {TID iT , PID} to the tag. Finally, the server stores
{TID iT , PID, (Ci ,Ri), (Cem ,Rem)} for each tag, but each tag
only stores its current temporary identity TID iT and PID for
future interactions. Details of this phase is depicted in Fig.1.
Authentication Phase of the Proposed Protocol for Ideal
PUFs: This phase accomplishes mutual authentication among
the RFID tag, the reader, and the backend server. Since each
reader is connected to the server through a secure link hence
we consider them (Reader-Server) as a single unit S . This
phase of the proposed scheme consists of the following steps:
Step 1: T → S :M1 :{TID iT , COUNT}.
The tag randomly generates a nonce, COUNT and then
selects its i-th round temporary identity TID iT and sends
{TID iT , COUNT} to the S .
Step 2: S → T :M2 :{Ci, R∗i , ResS}.
After receiving the authentication request, S locates TID iT
and reads (Ci ,Ri) from its memory. Hereafter, S gener-
ates a random number NS and computes R∗i = Ri⊕NS ,
ResS = h(COUNT+1||Ri ||R∗i ). At last, S constitutes a re-
sponse message M2 :{Ci, R∗i , ResS} and sends it to the
tag T . If the search of TID iT is failed, the authentication
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Figure 3. Setup Phase of the Enhanced Anonymous Authentication Protocol for Noisy-PUF-based RFID System
requests will be rejected and then S needs to ask the tag
to try again by using one of the un-used pseudo identities
from PID = {pid1, pid2 , ...,pidn}. Once a pseudo identity
is used up, it must be deleted from both the ends. In this case,
during the authentication process, S will select one of the un-
used emergency CRP from (Cem ,Rem) and a new temporary
identity TIDnewT will be provided to T for the next round in
an encoded way. Finally, like the pseudo identity, S also needs
to delete the used pair of emergency CRP from (Cem ,Rem). In
this way, we can resist DoS attacks [5] without compromising
anonymity support.
Step 3: T → S : M3 :{R∗i+1 , ResT}.
Upon receiving the response message from S , tag
T uses its PUF to generate the response Ri using
the challenge Ci and then validates the response pa-
rameter ResS . If the validation is successful then T
computes NS = Ri⊕R∗i , Ci+1 = h(COUNT + 2||NS ||Ri),
Ri+1 =PUFT (Ci+1), Ki = h(Ri ||NS ), R∗i+1 = Ki⊕Ri+1 ,
ResT = h(COUNT+2||Ki ||R∗i+1 ), TID i+1T =h(TID iT ||Ri+1 )
and sends M3 :{R∗i+1 , ResT} to S .
Step 4: V erification at Reader − Server Unit S .
After receiving the response from the tag, S first computes
Ki = h(Ri ||NS ) and subsequently verifies the response pa-
rameter ResT . If the verification is successful then S computes
the following: Ri+1 =Ki⊕R∗i+1 , Ci+1 = h(COUNT+2||NS
|| Ri), TID i+1T = h(TID
i
T ||Ri+1 ). At last, S stores {TID i+1T ,
(Ci+1 ,Ri+1 )} in its memory for the next round (i.e., i +1th)
communication.
If there is any failure in the validation process of the afore-
mentioned steps, then this phase of the proposed authentication
scheme will be terminated. On the other hand, successful
completion of this phase indicates that both T and S mutually
authenticate each other. Besides, it should be noted that, to
ensure higher degree of privacy in the proposed authentication
protocol, the server needs to maintain the secrecy of the stored
information. In that case, the server requires to encode the
responses {Ri , Rem} by using its master key MK , which
is stored in secure ROM-BIOS of the server. Once the tag
produces the a valid TID iT , then only the server decodes the
encoded response parameter. The details of the MAKA phase
are also depicted in Fig. 2.
D. Proposed Enhanced Anonymous Authentication Protocol
for Nosiy PUFs
Although differential design methodologies improve relia-
bility, the noise in the PUF could still be an issue. Therefore,
in this subsection, we present our enhanced protocol that can
support the noisy PUF environments. In this regard, we utilize
the concept of fuzzy extractor FE (d, y) which composes
with two algorithms: key generation algorithm FE.Gen and
reconstruction algorithm FE.Rec. The FE.Gen algorithm takes
Ri as input and outputs a key Ki and helper data hdi . Then,
the FE.Rec recovers the key Ki from the input variable R
′
i
and the helper data hdi , if the hamming distance between
the R
′
i and Ri is at most d . FE ensures security if the min-
entropy of the input Ri is at the minimum y, Ki is close to
a uniformly random in {0, 1}k . Since repeated exposure of
the helper data may result in additional min-entropy loss [36].
Therefore, during execution of the authentication protocol, the
helper data should not be exposed.
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Figure 4. Enhanced Lightweight and Practical Anonymous Authentication Protocol for Noisy-PUF-based RFID System
Setup Phase of the Enhanced Protocol: The server
randomly generates a challenge Ci and a set of emer-
gency challenges Cem={c1, c2,...,cn} and sends {Ci ,Cem}
to the tag T. After that, tag produces {Ri ,Rem} by us-
ing its unique embedded function PUFT and then sends
{Ri ,Rem} to the server. Hereafter, the server generates a
unique temporary identity TID iT for the i-th round. Then
the server also generates a set of unique un-linkable pseudo
identity PID={pid1,pid2,...,pidn}, and calculates (Ki ,hdi )
= FE.Gen(Ri ), (Kem ,hdem ) = FE.Gen(Rem ), and sends
{TID iT ,PID , (Ci ,hdi ), (Cem ,hdem )} to the tag. Finally, the
server stores {TID iT ,PID , (Ci ,K i ), (Cem ,K em )} for each tag
for future interactions. Details of this phase is depicted in Fig.
3.
Authentication Phase of the Enhanced Protocol: Similar
to our proposed ideal PUF-based scheme, we consider as
single unit S. This phase of the enhanced protocol consists
of the following steps:
Step 1: The tag randomly generates a nonce COUNT and
selects its i -th round temporary key TID iT and sends {TID
i
T
, COUNT} to the S.
Step 2:Upon receiving the authentication request, S searches
for TID iT and reads (Ci ,Ki ) for the tag from its memory.
After that, S generates a nonce NS and calculates N ∗S= Ki ⊕
NS , ResS= h(COUNT +1 || Ki || N ∗S ). Finally, S composes a
response message ME2 : {Ci , N
∗
S , ResS} and sends it to the
tag T.
Step 3: After receiving the response message from S, tag
T first searches its memory for Ci and picks the helper data
hdi . After that, T uses its PUF to generate R
′
i by using the
challenge Ci , and then calculates Ki=FE.Rec (R
′
i , hdi ) and
validates the response parameter ResS . If the validation is
successful, T calculates NS= Ki ⊕N ∗S , Ci+1=h(COUNT+2
|| NS ||Ki ), R
′
i+1= PUFT (Ci+1 ), R
∗
i+1= Ki⊕R
′
i+1 , ResT=
h(Ns || Ki || R∗i+1 ), and sends ME3 : {R
∗
i+1 , ResT} to S.
Step 4: Upon receiving the response from the tag, S
first validates the parameter ResT . If the validation is suc-
cessful then S computes R
′
i+1 = Ki⊕R∗i+1 , (Ki+1 ,hdi+1 )
= FE.Gen(R
′
i+1 ), Ci+1=h(COUNT+2 || NS ||Ki ), hd
∗
i+1=
h(COUNT+3 || Ki )⊕hdi+1 , Vs=h(hd∗i+1 || Ki ), TID i+1T =
h(TID iT ||Ki ) and sends {hd
∗
i+1 , Vs} to the tag T. Finally,
S stores {TID i+1T , (Ci+1 , Ki+1 )} for the next round com-
munication.
After receiving {hd∗i+1 , Vs} from S, the tag T first checks
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the parameter Vs . If the verification is successful, T calculates
hdi+1= h(COUNT+3 || Ki )⊕ hd∗i+1 , TID i+1T = h(TID iT ||Ki )
and stores {TID i+1T , (Ci+1 , hdi+1 )} for the next round
interaction with S. If there is any failure in the verification
process of the above steps, this phase of the enhanced scheme
will be terminated. In the case of loss of synchronization
or DoS attacks, that can be comprehended if the response
message ME2 or ME4 has been interrupted, so that the tag
cannot receive the message within a specific time period. In
that case, the tag T needs to use one of the un-used pseudo
identities pid∈ PID , and similarly S will select an unused
pair of (cj , kj )∈(Cem , Kem ) and uses (cj , kj ) in composing
the response message ME2 . At the end of the authentication
process, the tag T will delete (cj , hdj ) from its memory and S
will delete (cj , kj ) from its database. The details of this phase
of our enhanced scheme is depicted in Fig. 4.
It should note that to provide desired security level in
the PUF-based authentication scheme, it is imperative that
the PUF response should be stable and uniform. When PUF
response is unstable and biased, helper data may leak informa-
tion about seed (entropy loss). In addition, it will be difficult
to extract entropy from unstable response. One of the conven-
tional methods for extracting stable and uniform response from
unstable and biased PUFs is debiasing. Debiased response can
ensure full-entropy and it is applied to PUF response prior to
FE. Recently, Aysu et al. [39] and Suzuki et al. [40] indepen-
dently introduced two debiasing methods for lightweight PUFs
while Wang et al. [41] proposed a new PUF design called
locally enhanced defectivity physically unclonable function
(LEDPUF), which can ensure higher degree of stability in
the PUF design. Unlike the conventional parametric PUFs,
LEDPUF does not require any kinds of correction schemes.
Now, similar to [34-35] and [38], in our proposed scheme,
we assume that the PUF response to be stable and uniform.
However, to strengthen our scheme to work even in the
environment where PUF responses may not be stable and
uniform, we can adopt the idea of [39-40] or [41]. For instance,
in designing the ideal PUF-based anonymous authentication
scheme (presented in Section II-C), we can consider LEDPUF
[41]. On the other hand, for secure key generation in the con-
struction of the noisy PUF-based anonymous authentication
scheme (presented in Section II-D), we can use the debiasing
methods ([39] or [40]) to PUF response prior to FE (as shown
in Fig. 5).
III. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we formally analyze our ideal PUFs-based
lightweight anonymous authentication scheme on the major
security requirements. Similarly, we can also analyze the
formal security of the enhanced protocol.
A. Adversarial Model
We consider an adversary A who has the control over
the radio communication channel between a tag T and the
(Reader-Server) unit S . A needs to model the following set
of queries in polynomial time.
Figure 5. Debiasing PUF-based key generator
• Send(S , m1, x1, m2) : This query models the adversary’s
ability to act like a legitimate tag. In this regard, A sends
m1 and receives x1 from S and then replies m2 to S .
• Query(T , x2, m2) : This query models the adversary’s
ability to investigate a tag. For that, A sends x2 to T and
receives m2 from T .
• Execute(T ,S ) : This query models the adversary’s
ability to continuously observe the radio channel between
T and S . In this context, A needs to intercept on
the channel during the execution of an instance of the
protocol between T and S .
• Block(A): This query models the adversary’s ability to
launch DoS attack. In this regard, A is allowed to block
a part of the protocol and break the synchronization
between T and S .
• Reveal(T ): Modeling this query A obtains the contents
of the tag’s memory. In other words, this query models
adversary’s ability to corrupt a tag and obtains the secrets
stored in its memory.
It should be noted that A can call Send, Query, Execute, and
Block queries any polynomial number of times but can call
Reveal query only once. Furthermore, based on the definitions
of adversaries as discussed in Section II.A and the above
formal adversarial model, a Type 1 adversary can call all the
oracle queries except Reveal oracle. On the other hand, a
Type 2 adversary has the ability to invoke all the oracle queries
including the Reveal oracle.
B. Assumptions
1) Uncloneability assumption: We make standard assump-
tion, where it is impossible to predict the behavior of PUF
without having the physical device. Consider a PUF, which can
be defined as PUF: {0, 1}l1→{0, 1}l2 that on input of length
l1 produces a random string of the length l2 . Security of this
function can be determined through the following challenge-
response game , which consists of two phases:
Phase1: An adversary A randomly chooses a challenge Ci
and obtains the PUF response Ri .
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Challenge: Now A selects a challenge Cx that has not been
queried before.
Phase 2: A can query the PUF for challenges other than
Cx .
Response: Finally, A outputs its guess for R′x for PUF’s
response to Rx= PUF(Cx ).
A wins the game if R′x =Rx , which can be denoted as
AdvpufA (l2 )= Pr
[
Rx = R
′
x
]
.
2) Pseudo random function assumption: A pseudorandom
function PRF:{0, 1}k×{0, 1}∗→{0, 1}k ′ which takes a secret
security parameter K {0, 1}k and a message M {0, 1}∗ as
input and provides an arbitrary string PRF(K , M) which is
indistinguishable from random string. Now, assuming that
h be a polynomial-time computable pseudorandom function.
For distinguishing h, a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT)
adversary A may request polynomial bounded queries with
its selected inputs and obtain the outputs computed by h for
training. After the training phase, A is given a function, which
is either h or a truly random function. We say that h is a
pseudo-random function, if it is indistinguishable from a truly
random function under A . Namely, A is given either h or a
truly random function according to a random bit {0, 1} and it
has only the probability 12 + ε, to distinguish h.
C. Security Analysis
Lemma 1: In the proposed ideal PUFs-based lightweight
anonymous authentication protocol the secret data of a tag
cannot be revealed any secret even calling the Reveal oracle.
Proof: A legitimate tag needs to request with the updated
temporary identity TID iT , and responds to a reader’s query
with the valid response parameter ResT = h(COUNT+2||Ki ||
R∗i+1 ), R
∗
i+1=Ki⊕Ri+1 . In these messages, the session key
Ki is used as a key security parameter, which is generated
based on the secret response parameter Ri . Without knowing
Ri , the adversary A cannot generate Ki . Now, in our proposed
scheme, tag need not to store any secret security credential,
therefore, if the adversary calls a Reveal oracle to obtain
secret from the tag memory, then she may only manage
to obtain TID iT . With that she cannot pass the reader’s
interrogation process. Most importantly, since any authorized
attempt to access the PUF will change its CRP behavior, then
that will eventually renders the tag useless.
Lemma 2: In the proposed scheme the temporary identities
of the tag cannot be correlated without calling the Reveal
oracle.
Proof: Since each temporary identity TID i+1T (valid
only for the i+1-th round) is generated from the random
response Ri+1 and one-way hash function h i.e., TID i+1T =
h(TID iT ||Ri+1 ). Hence, it will be difficult for an adversary to
correlate TID iT with the temporary identity for the next round
TID i+1T as well as with the original one, unless A calls the
Reveal oracle.
Theorem 1 (Untraceability): In the proposed authentication
protocol, tags are universally untraceable.
Proof: In RFID system, a tag is universally untraceable
[4], if an adversary A cannot correlate two of its successful
authentication requests and responses with a valid reader-
server unit S . This can be modeled by the following game
between a challenger C as a RFID system and the adversary
A. It is assumed that the power of both C and A is not more
than polynomial-time algorithm:
1) C selects a valid reader-server unit S and two tags T1
and T2.
2) A calls the following oracles: Send, Query, Execute,
and Block on S and T1 and T2 for a polynomial number
of times.
3) After finishing calling the oracles A notifies C.
4) C randomly chooses one of the tags T .
5) A calls the following oracles: Send, Query, Execute,
and Block on S and T .
6) A predicts her guess T ′ and wins the game if T ′= T .
In this case, the advantages of successfully guessing is defined
as AdvA= 2×
(
Pr
[
T
′
= T
]
− 12
)
. Tags are claimed to be un-
traceable if the the adversary A does not have any advantages
on the random guess and for that Pr(T
′
= T ) = 12 and hence
AdvA is zero.
Now, we follow the above game to ensure universal un-
traceability of the tags in the proposed authentication protocol.
In this context, we assume C successfully carries out the
authentication process between each tags, T1 and T2, and the
reader-server unit S . Then, C randomly chooses one of the
tags T and gives it to A. A predicts her guess T ′after calling
the following oracles Send, Query, Execute, and Block.
Since, A cannot infer the secret response of the i-th round i.e.,
Ri so that she cannot produce the correct temporary identity
TID i+1T for the i+1th round (by Lemma1). Accordingly, she
cannot correlate the temporary identities to each other (by
Lemma 2). Therefore, A has only one choice i.e., a random
guess
(
Pr
[
T
′
= T
]
− 12
)
and based on the above equation
of AdvA the advantage of the adversary is zero. So, our
proposed lightweight anonymous authentication protocol can
ensure universal untracebility.
Theorem 2: The proposed ideal PUFs-based lightweight
anonymous authentication protocol can ensure forward secrecy
with backward untraceability support.
Proof: To ensure forward secrecy with backward untrace-
ability support we model a game which is similar to the
universally untraceable one, except that in the last phase the
adversary needs to invoke the Reveal oracle on the tag. C
selects a valid reader-server unit S and two tags T1 and T2
and provides them to A. Now, A calls the following oracles:
Send, Query, Execute, and Block on S and T1 and T2
for a polynomial number of times. Hereafter, C successfully
carries out the authentication process between each tags, T1
and T2, and the reader-server unit S . Then C randomly chooses
one of the tags T and gives it to A. Then A invokes the
Reveal oracle on the tag T obtains all the current data from
the tag memory i.e., the current temporary identity. Finally, A
outputs her guess T
′
. Since, the current temporary identity is
generated from the hash of the previous one, so A cannot
inverse the hash function. Besides, each CRP is randomly
generated, hence they are expected to be independent to each
other. Furthermore, it should be noted that in our proposed
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scheme we do not store any secrets such as key in the tag
memory. To sum up, since all the secrets used in the proposed
protocol is one-time hence, if the adversary can manage the
current temporary identity and CRP, however A still cannot
trace the tag owner by using the compromised information.
The adversary will not have any advantage over random guess.
Hence, the proposed scheme can ensure forward secrecy with
backward untraceability support.
Theorem 3: The proposed protocol accomplishes mutual
authentication.
Proof: The adversary A may try to authenticate herself
as a legitimate tag, which can be modeled by the following
game between the A and the challenger C.
1) C selects a valid reader-server unit S and a tag T .
2) A calls the following oracles: Send, Query, Execute,
and Block on S and T for a polynomial number of
times.
3) After finishing calling oracles A notifies C.
4) A invokes the Send oracle to impersonate a tag.
5) If A can authenticate herself as a legitimate tag then A
wins the game.
Now, to prove her legitimacy A must responds to the in-
terrogation of the reader-server unit S . For that, A needs
to send a valid temporary identity TID iT and also needs to
generate a valid response message ResT = h(COUNT+2 ||
Ki || R∗i+1 ). In that case, A must know the secret response
of the i-th round i.e., Ri . However, by Lemma 1, A cannot
expose the secret response Ri and that implies she cannot
impersonate as a legitimate tag. On the other hand, to be
authenticated as a reader-server unit, A needs to invoke a
Query oracle in (4) and also needs to sends a valid CRP with
the legitimate response message ResS = h(COUNT+1||Ri ||
R∗i ). Since A cannot infer Ri , hence cannot produce the
valid ResS . Accordingly, A cannot impersonate as a legitimate
reader. In our proposed scheme only a legitimate tag and
reader-server unit can mutually authenticate each other with
the support of valid CRP.
Lemma 3: The proposed scheme can ensure the resilience
of DoS attacks.
Proof: In our proposed protocol, to deal with DoS attack
we utilize the concept of set of unlinkable pseudo identi-
ties PID and emergency CRP(Cem ,Rem). Now, we assume
that the adversary A invokes the Block oracle and due to
that backend server cannot receive the response message
M3 :{R∗i+1 ,ResT}and hence cannot obtain the CRP for the
next round i.e., (Ci+1 ,Ri+1 ). To deal with this issue, the tag
needs to use one of the pseudo identity from PID = {pid1,
pid2 , ...,pidn}. Once the server receives pidi instead of TID iT
then it selects one of the un-used emergency CRP from
(Cem ,Rem) and continue the authentication process with that.
In this way, we ensure security against DoS to desynchroniza-
tion attacks.
Lemma 4: The proposed RFID authentication scheme can
ensure security against any physical and cloning attack.
Proof: Since an attacker can get access secrets stored in
the RFID device through Reveal oracle. Hence, it is desirable
that tags should not store any secret within its memory.
However, most of the existing RFID authentication protocols
rely on one or more secrets (in the form of keys) to be stored
in the tag’s memory. Hence, this approach can lead to leakage
of key. In our proposed scheme, we do not store any keys in
the tag memory. Besides, the PUF and micro-controller of the
tag are considered as inseparable. Accordingly, we can argue
that even if an adversary has the access of RFID tag, but
she cannot compromise the security of the proposed protocol.
Furthermore, since PUFs are safe against cloning and a PUF
cannot be recreated [3]. In our proposed scheme we require
each tag device to be equipped with PUF. Hence, the proposed
RFID authentication protocol can be regarded safe against
cloning attacks.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
In general, RFID tags have limited resources, so it is
important that apart from security, any designed protocol
for RFID system should consider the efficiency in terms
of memory footprint, and storage, computation and com-
munication overhead. In this section, we first compare the
performance of the proposed ideal PUF-based anonymous
authentication protocol with some of the recently proposed
RFID authentication protocols such as [22], [23], [25], and
[26] for the same environment. Subsequently, we compare our
enhanced anonymous authentication protocol with a recently
proposed RFID authentication protocol [35] for the noisy PUF
environment.
Now, we compare the performance of the proposed ideal
PUF-based scheme based on some important security prop-
erties for RFID system as shown in Table II. From Table II,
we can see that our proposed ideal PUF-based scheme can
satisfy all the important required security requirements of the
RFID system, while other proposed protocols for the same
environment cannot guarantee several security requirements.
For instance, none of the ideal PUF-based existing schemes
can ensure forward secrecy (i.e., SP4) with the resistance of
DoS attacks. Besides, even though these schemes are based
on PUF, they are still vulnerable to physical attacks since a
tag needs to store all required security credentials (i.e., secret
key). Therefore, by intelligent side-channel attacks [28], the
attacker can easily access those secret credentials stored in the
RFID device. Then, the attacker can easily trace back all the
previous communications of the tag as the existing schemes
cannot ensure forward secrecy. Furthermore, in the existing
schemes, the backend server needs to do exhaustive search to
identify the tag, which makes those schemes not scalable.
We also compare the performance of the proposed ideal
PUF-based scheme in terms of the computation cost as shown
in Table III. Table III shows the numbers of operations includ-
ing hash (denoted by h), random number generator (denoted
by RNG), and PUF (denoted by P ), those operations are
required by our proposed scheme and existing ideal PUF-based
schemes for RFID system. From Table III, we can clearly
see that the computation overhead of the proposed ideal PUF-
based scheme is similar to that of the existing schemes for the
same environment even it provides better security as shown
earlier in Table II.
In Table IV, we now compare the efficiency of our proposed
ideal PUF-based scheme to the existing schemes in terms of
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Table II
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BASED ON THE REQUIRED SECURITY PROPERTIES (SP)
Schemes SP1 SP2 SP3 SP4 SP5 SP6 SP7 SP8
Sadeghi et al. [22] No Yes No No NA Yes No Yes
Ideal PUF Akgun et al. [23] Yes No No No No Yes No Yes
Case Kardas et al. [25] Yes Yes No No No Yes No Yes
Akgun et al. [26] Yes Yes No No NA Yes No Yes
Proposed Scheme Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Noisy PUF Aysu et al. [35] Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huth et al. [38] Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Case Proposed Scheme Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SP1: Mutual Authentication; SP2: Untraceability; SP3: Scalability; SP4: Forward Secrecy; SP5: Resilience of DoS Attacks;
SP6: Uncloneability; SP7: Security Against Physical Attacks; SP8: Without Additional Key-agreement Support;
Table III
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BASED ON THE COMPUTATIONAL COST
Schemes Tag Reader-Server Unit
Sadeghi et al. [22] 4h + 2P + RNG 5h + RNG
Ideal PUF Akgun et al. [23] 4h + P + RNG 4h+ RNG
Case Kardas et al. [25] 5h + 2P+ RNG 4h + RNG
Akgun et al. [26] 4h + 2P+ RNG 4h+ RNG
Proposed Scheme 4h + 2P+ RNG 4h+ RNG
Noisy PUF Aysu et al. [35] 3h + 2P+ RNG +FE .Gen+SKE 3h+ RNG+FE .Rec+SKD
Huth et al. [38] CBKA (CM+Q+IR+PA) + 3h + 2P+ RNG +FE .Gen+SKE CBKA (CM+Q+IR+PA)+3h+ RNG+FE .Rec+SKD
Case Proposed Scheme 5h + 2P+RNG+FE .Rec 5h+RNG+FE .Gen
h : Hash Operations; P : PUF Operations; RNG : Random number generator;
SKE/D : Symmetric Key Encryptions/Decryption; FE .Gen/Rec : Fuzzy Extractor Generation/Reconstruction;
CM : Channel Mesurement; Q : Quantization; IR : Information Reconcilation; PA : Privacy Amplification;
Table IV
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BASED ON THE OTHER COST
Schemes Tag Memory Footprint Tag Storage Overhead Communication Cost
Sadeghi et al. [22] 768-bit 640-bit 1280-bit
Ideal PUF Akgun et al. [23] 768-bit 384-bit 1280-bit
Case Kardas et al. [25] 640-bit 768-bit 1408-bit
Akgun et al. [26] 640-bit 512-bit 896-bit
Proposed Scheme 576-bit 128 + n×64-bit 832-bit
Noisy PUF Aysu et al. [35] 1392-bit 192-bit 2476-bit
Huth et al. [38] 1392-bit 1804-bit 4140-bit
Case Proposed Scheme 1264-bit 1456 + n×1392-bit 2154-bit
tag memory footprint size, tag storage overhead, and commu-
nication cost. Here, the tag memory footprint size denotes the
amount of the memory required during the execution of an
authentication protocol. Table IV shows that the tag memory
footprint size for the proposed ideal PUF-based scheme is 576-
bit, which is reasonably less than other existing schemes for
the same environment. Besides, the proposed protocol is more
efficient than other schemes in terms of storage requirements.
For the normal execution of our proposed protocol, a tag needs
to store its current temporary identity only (not previous ones),
and this causes 128-bit of storage cost, which is significantly
less than those of other schemes. Furthermore, from Table IV,
we can also notice that the communication cost of the proposed
noise-resilient PUF-based protocol is also less than those of
other schemes for the same environment.
Note that to handle DoS attacks in our proposed ideal PUF-
based protocol, we need to store a few number (i.e., n) of
un-linkable pseudo identities of 64-bits. In this regard, the
tag can use at most t number of pseudo identities where
t ≤ n − 1. After that, the tag needs to request the server for
re-loading pseudo identities. For that in the request message
M1, tag needs to include its t + 1th pseudo identity, nonce
(COUNT), and “Re-Loading”. After authenticating the tag,
the system generates a set of new (t + 1) un-linkable pseudo
identities, encrypts them using the session key Ki , and sends
it to the tag. An attackers may continuously interrupt the
interrogations to destroy the unlinkability. This kind of attack
can be prevented with sufficient pseudo identities, but there
will be more cost in terms of storage and maintaining the
identities. Here, we assume the tag has relatively enough
pseudo identities to limit the failure for reloading new set of
un-linkable pseudo identities and temporary identity. When all
the pseudo identities are used up and the tag fails to reload
pseudo identities, the tag will execute the setup phase of the
proposed scheme and reload itself with the new set of un-
linkable pseudo identities and temporary identity.
Furthermore, we also consider the “Usability Problem”,
where an attacker has a temporary access (say, for a few
minutes) of the device, and then he/she may try to deplete
all pseudo identities before the owner comes back. Here the
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device owner can maintain a hash of a secret code in the
device and the secret code needs to be remembered by the
owner. Now, while the attacker or the device owner wants to
utilize the (t + 1)-th pseudo identity, he/she needs to input
the secret code. The device will check the validity with the
hash of the secret code stored in its memory. Whenever the
device owner wants to change his/her secret code, he/she must
submit the old secret code first, so that the device can validate
the old secret code. If the validation is successful, the device
owner will be allowed to update his/her secret code with the
new one.
Next, we compare our proposed protocol with existing pro-
tocols in [35] and [38] for the noisy PUF environment. From
Table II, we can see that our enhanced scheme for noisy PUF
environment can ensure all the security properties, whereas
the protocol presented in [35] cannot support untraceability
and scalability properties (discussed in Section IB). On the
other hand, in [38], the protocol needs to perform the CBKA
phase prior execution of the authentication phase, which will
cause additional overhead. In addition, the similar to [35], the
protocol cannot support scalability property as for identifying
a tag, the server needs to perform exhaustive search operation.
We have also compared our proposed protocol with the
schemes in [35] and [38] in terms of costs for computation,
communication, storage, and tag memory footprint. First, Ta-
ble III shows the comparison result based on the computational
cost, and we can see that the protocol presented in [35]
requires an additional cryptographic primitive i.e., symmetric
key encryption/decryption. On the other hand, the protocol
presented in [38] needs to bear the additional overhead of the
CBKA phase. In Table IV, we compare our enhanced scheme
with [35] and [38] in terms of the communication cost, storage
cost and tag memory footprint, as compared to our enhanced
scheme. Here, we consider the length of each variable as
similar as mentioned in Table 1 of [35]. From the bottom part
of Table IV, we can see that our enhanced scheme requires
less communication cost and tag memory footprint than the
protocol in [35] and [38]. The protocol presented in [38]
requires additional 208-bytes of communication cost. Next,
we consider the storage overhead of the proposed scheme.
Here, we consider the sizes of the temporary identity as 128-
bit, pseudo identity as 64-bit, helper data as 1264-bit (as
mentioned in Table 1 of [35]), and he challenge variable Ci
as 64-bit (as mentioned in Table 1 of [35]). Therefore, in
the case of normal execution, the storage overhead of our
noisy PUF-based scheme is TID iT + hdi + Ci=1456-bit. On
the other hand, for handling DoS attacks and in case of n
synchronous executions, the storage overheard of our noisy
PUF-based scheme is n × PID + hdem +Ci= n×1392-bit.
From Table IV, we can see that, our proposed scheme needs
larger tag storage than that of the protocol in [35]. Hence, the
enhanced scheme can be suitable for the RFID tags with large
storage capacity based [37] such as IQC 37, IQC 42, IQC 43,
etc.
A. Formal Security Verification Using AVISPA Tool
The proposed authentication protocol for ideal PUF is also
evaluated by using the formal verification tool, Automated
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Figure 6. Outcome of the analysis of our proposed scheme using OFMC
Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications
(AVISPA) [29-30], which provides automated validation of the
security sensitive protocols and applications. It contains four
backends and abstraction-based methods that are integrated
through the high level protocol specific language (HLPSL).
The outcome of the formal security verification of our pro-
posed scheme using On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC) back-
end is shown in Fig. 6 which shows that our proposed scheme
is safe. The details of the implementation process of the
proposed scheme are provided in the supplementary material.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we first proposed a lightweight anonymous
authentication protocol for RFID system using ideal PUF.
Subsequently, considering the noise at PUF, we proposed an
enhanced protocol which can support the noisy PUF envi-
ronment. We analyzed the security and the performance of
the proposed schemes. Analyses show that our protocols still
remains safe even if an adversary has a physical access to an
RFID tag. The proposed protocols ensures the desired security
properties efficiently by exploiting the inherent security feature
of PUFs. Specifically, tags do not require to store any secret
(such as key). Overall, the performance of the proposed
schemes are better than those of other existing PUF-based
authentication protocols for RFID. Therefore, our proposed
approaches is more suitable for designing a secure RFID
system.
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